University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary

1995

Hate Speech and the Constitution.
Murray Dry

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Dry, Murray, "Hate Speech and the Constitution." (1995). Constitutional Commentary. 798.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/798

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

HATE SPEECH AND THE CONSTITUTION
Murray Dry*
On June 22, 1992, the United States Supreme Court unanimously struck down a bias-motivated crime ordinance in R.A. V.
v. St. Paul, Minnesota,! and then on June 11, 1993 it unanimously
upheld a penalty enhancement provision for bias-motivated
crimes in Wisconsin v. Mitchel/.2 These two different decisions in
otherwise similar cases appear to be explicable on the basis of
the difference between speech, or expression, which is protected
by the First Amendment, and conduct, which is not, as the
Supreme Court maintained.3 In the first case, petitioner R.A.V.
was charged with burning a cross on a black family's lawn; the
Court regarded such conduct as protected symbolic expression.
In the second case, Mitchell was convicted of aggravated battery
and then had his sentence enhanced, from two years to four,
when the jury determined that he had selected his victim on the
basis of race. Mitchell, who is black, directed three of his friends
to beat up a white boy, after they had all seen the movie Mississippi Burning, in which "a white man beat up a black boy who
was praying."4
The cases are complicated and worthy of careful study for
two reasons. First, the Supreme Court divided five to four on the
grounds of the decision in the R.A. V. case. In his court opinion,
Justice Scalia complicated first amendment law by extending
some protection to forms of expression, such as "fighting words,"
that had previously been viewed as categories of simply unprotected speech; the four concurring Justices took issue with that,
claiming both that it was unnecessary since the law was overbroad in the first place, and also that if the law had not been
overbroad the substantial harm of the prohibited symbolic expression justified the prohibition. Second, the Mitchell case was
• Charles A. Dana Professor of Political Science, Middlebury College, Vermont.
1. -U.S.-; 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
2. -U.S.-; 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
3. "But whereas the ordinance struck down in R.A.V. was explicitly directed at
expression ... the statute in this case is aimed at conduct unprotected by the First
Amendment." ld. at 2201.
4. ld. at 2196.
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closer to the R.A. V. case-and more difficult-than the Supreme
Court acknowledged. The Wisconsin Supreme Court treated the
issues more fully, as we shall see. In addition, Professor Cass
Sunstein, who supported the Mitchell decision, nonetheless wrote
the following:
But consider the fact that the government imposes the additional penalty because it thinks that hate crimes create distinctive subjective and objective harm. The distinctive harm is
produced in part because of the symbolic or expressive nature
of hate crimes. This justification is the same as that in the
cross-burning case. This does not mean that it is impossible to
draw distinctions between enhanced penalty statutes and 'hate
speech' laws. But it does mean that if the justification for the
hate crimes measures is sufficiently neutral, the same should
be said for narrow restrictions on hate speech.5

The two cases, then, may be said to deal with one topic, hate
speech, or as the late Harry Kalven called it, "ideological fighting
words. "6 In some respects, these cases offer a replay of the constitutional controversies that gave rise to some of our current
first amendment doctrines: "fighting words," in Chaplinsky v.
New Hamsphire (1942), what Kalven called "ideological fighting
words" in Terminiello v. Chicago (1949), and "group libel" in
Beauharnais v. Illinois (1953). The replay, however, takes place
against a backdrop of the more speech protective cases of the
1960s and 1970s: New York Times v. Sullivan (1964), Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), and Cohen v. California (1971), as well as
the flag burning cases of 1989 and 1990. It also takes place at a
time when there is both a widespread concern about and a controversy over the distinctive harms resulting from speech or conduct which singles out individuals or groups on the basis of race
or gender, sexual preference, religion, or national origin.
The origin of this hate speech controversy is the movement
for "hate speech" codes on college and university campuses, notably at Michigan and Stanford in 1989-1990. In the Michigan
case, a federal district court overturned Michigan's speech code
and the university did not appeal the decision.7 The Stanford
case did not get into the courts as Stanford is a private school,
but it was debated on campus in terms of the first amendment
5. Cass Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 795, 826 (1993).
6. Harry Kalven Jr., A Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in America 80-81 (Jamie Kalven, ed., Harper Row, 1988).
7. Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
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standard and that debate has been widely publicized.s Many
other colleges and universities followed with their own versions
of a harassment or hate speech code, and I think it will become
clear that the intensity of disagreement among the Justices in the
R.A. V. case was due at least in part to the effect of that decision
on speech codes at public colleges and universities.
In part one, then, I will discuss the R.A. V. case. I will focus
on three things: the concurring Justices' argument for decision by
way of overbreadth; the majority opinion's application of two related requirements-content neutrality and viewpoint neutrality-to speech hitherto regarded as categorically not protected
and hence subject to prohibition; and Justice Stevens' argument
concerning the inadequacy of the categorical approach and nature of the harm of hate speech.
In part two, I will discuss Wisconsin v. Mitchell, beginning
with the opinions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. As already
noted, the main issue concerns the extent to which protected
speech is indirectly but nonetheless significantly punished. A
related topic concerns the relationship between a penalty-enhancing statute and anti-discrimination laws.
Finally, in conclusion, I will bring the two cases together by
considering the conflict between, on the one hand, the neutrality
requirement, with respect to content and especially "viewpoint,"
and, on the other, the harm of hate speech and the case for enhanced penalties for hate crimes as a way of getting around the
first amendment barrier.
I

The city of St. Paul prosecuted "R.A.V." (the names of
juveniles are withheld for confidentiality), under a Bias Motivated Crime Ordinance for allegedly constructing a crudelymade cross and burning it inside the fenced yard of a black family. The authorities apparently chose to prosecute under the ordinance, rather than under more specific felony statutes9 to
8. Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 1134-37 (Foundation Press, 12th ed. 1991).
Professor Gunther, who was himself actively engaged in opposing a speech code at Stanford, provides important information about the regulation (at 1135 n.2), to which I will
return.
9. Justice Scalia identifies the following statutes which covered R.A.V.'s criminal
conduct: one providing for up to five years imprisonment for terrorist threats; one providing for up to five years for arson; and one providing for up to one year and a $3,000 fine
for damage to property. 112 S. Ct. at 2541 n.l.
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highlight the city's condemnation of "hate crimes."to The ordinance made it a misdemeanor for anyone to place "on public or
private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization
or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi
swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know
arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender. ... "n The state district court
found the ordinance in violation of the First Amendment, but
Minnesota's Supreme Court reversed, upholding the ordinance
by interpreting it to reach no more than unprotected expression
under the "fighting words" doctrine. According to that doctrine,
"fighting words are those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. "1z The
Minnesota court said: "the ordinance censors only those displays
that one knows or should know will create anger, alarm, or resentment based on racial, ethnic, gender, or religious bias."B
The United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed,
holding the ordinance unconstitutional. Justice White's preferred basis for deciding this case, with which Justices Blackmun,
O'Connor and Stevens agreed, was to hold that the state
supreme court had not narrowed the ordinance sufficiently, because it still criminalized protected speech: "expressive conduct
that causes only hurt feelings, offense, or resentment. "14 Even if
10. I learned this from a telephone conversation, placed in the summer of 1992, with
city attorney Natalie Hudson. I also learned that petitioner probably could not be
charged under any of the other statutes, such as racially motivated assault, since after the
Supreme Court decision he was no longer a minor. After having finished this article, I
came across Edward J. Cleary's recently published book, Beyond the Burning Cross: The
First Amendment and the Landmark R.A. V. Case (Random House, 1994). Mr. Cleary, an
attorney who practices in St. Paul, Minn., was assigned to represent "R.A.V.," Robert
Anthony Viktora, on June 25, 1990, along with every other juvenile who appeared in
court that morning. He subsequently represented "R.A.V." all the way to the U.S.
Supreme Court. Id. at 112. Mr. Cleary reports that
[s]everal juveniles involved in the June 21, 1990 incident (including R.A.V.)
were convicted in January 1993 of violating 18 U.S.C. § 241 and 42 U.S.C. § 3631
by a federal judge sitting without a jury. Both of these provisions punish all
threats aimed at the exercise of federally guaranteed rights or privileges, unlike
the St. Paul ordinance which prohibited the mere expression of an unpopular
opinion. The individuals were referred for probable commitment to state juvenile facilities. Further details were withheld by federal authorities. Then on
April26, 1994, a three-judge panel from the Eighth Circuit denied the appeals of
all the juveniles. R.A.V., whose constitutional right to a bigoted viewpoint had
been upheld after a two-year struggle, had eventually been punished for his conduct in the early morning hours of June 21, 1990.
Id. at 256 n.223.
11. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541.
12. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
13. In re R.A. V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510 (1991).
14. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2560 (White, J., concurring).
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petitioner's conduct would have been punishable under a narrowly drawn ordinance, given the importance of freedom of
speech, he is permitted to challenge the ordinance in the name of
those whose expression is unconstitutionally "chilled." What is
left of the "fighting words," if we follow Justice White's approach? In the original formulation, there were two "strands" to
the doctrine: words "which by their very utterance inflict injury,"
and those which "tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace." Given the subsequent decisions involving libel and "offensive speech," the latter of which include all kinds of profane
speech, it is not clear what remains of the first strand of the doctrine. The second strand might be reducible to speech "directed
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and ... likely to
incite or produce such action," which can be prohibited under
Brandenburg v. Ohio.ts In that case, a more candid treatment of
the overbreadth issue would have required Justice White to acknowledge that the "fighting words" doctrine has been reduced
to the Brandenburg "incitement" test.
If a majority had formed behind Justice White's "overbreadth" analysis, tighter hate speech codes would not have become presumptively unconstitutional, which may account for the
majority opinion of Justice Scalia, which Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas joined. Accepting the state's interpretation of the ordinance as limited to "fighting words," Justice
Scalia applied the "content-neutrality" rule to strike it down.
The doctrine of "content-neutrality" means that government cannot regulate or prohibit speech or expression on the basis of "its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."t6 The doctrine is complicated-sometimes it is presented in a narrower
version as "viewpoint neutrality" -but it had always been applied to speech that could be indirectly regulated but could not
be prohibited. For example, an otherwise legitimate regulation
of speech on the basis of time, place, or manner (i.e., no picketing near a school when it is in session) would be invalidated if it
discriminated on the basis of the content of the message (i.e., no
picketing near a school, except for labor unions). For the first
time, the Court majority applied the content neutrality requirement to categories of proscribable speech, such as obscenity or
"fighting words." This novelty is revealed by examining Justice
Scalia's reinterpretation of the Court's earlier account of its categorical approach. Under the earlier account, such unprotected
15. 395 u.s. 444, 447 (1969).
16. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
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categories were " 'not within the area of constitutionally protected speech'." Justice Scalia interpreted this to mean "that
these areas of speech can, consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable
content (obscenity, defamation, etc.)-not that they are categories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they
may be made the vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to
their distinctively proscribable content."t7 Justice Scalia cited
New York v. Ferber,ts where the Court upheld the state's prohibition on child pornography, since there was no question of censoring a particular literary theme (which is to say no content
discrimination was involved).19 But that case involved protected
speech-non-obscene pornography-where an otherwise impermissible prohibition was upheld on the grounds of the special
harm associated with the use of minors in making such protected
pornography. As Justice Scalia remarked, no content discrimination was involved. R.A. V. was the first time the Court held that
categorically unprotected speech was subject to the protection of
the content-neutrality rule. Thus, it is now impermissible to pick
out certain "fighting words" for punishment on the basis of
content.
Justice White criticized this position by saying it introduced
a prohibition on "under-inclusiveness," and that the Court was
insisting on an "all or nothing" approach to proscribable speech.
And Justice Stevens criticized Justice Scalia for relying on content neutrality in the first place. Drawing on his plurality opinions in Young v. American Mini Theatres Inc.w and FCC v.
Pacifica,zt in which he introduced the concept of levels of protected speech to justify restrictions on "adult entertainment" and
crude words on the radio, as well as his concurring opinions in
the child pornography case and certain commercial speech cases,
Justice Stevens argued that the Court has not always followed
content neutrality and that it should not.zz
Justice Scalia tried to defend his position by holding onto the
categorical approach and by responding to Justice White. Justice
Scalia responded first by arguing that a content neutrality requirement is narrower than under-inclusiveness. Then he argued
that content discrimination is permissible when "the basis for [it]
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

112 S. Ct. at 2543.
458 u.s. 747 (1982).
ld. at 763.
427 u.s. 50 (1976).
438 U.S. 726 (1978).
R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2564, 2566-68 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at
issue is proscribable. "23 His illustration is a state choosing to
prohibit only the most patently offensive of obscenity, when it
could prohibit it all; that is constitutional, but a state choosing to
prohibit "only that obscenity which includes offensive political
messages" would not be permitted.24 Another example draws on
Watts v. United States,25 where the Court upheld a federal law
criminalizing threats of violence directed against the President;
this is legitimate "under inclusiveness," for Justice Scalia,
whereas criminalizing only those threats "that mention his policy
on aid to inner cities" would be invalid.26 Justice Scalia also suggested that content-based classifications are permissible where
they are associated with "particular 'secondary effects' of the
speech" which produce harms that can be prohibited.27
Justice Scalia's clearest and best statement is that content
discrimination may be allowed as long as "there is no realistic
possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot."28 The worst
form of content discrimination, in other words, is viewpoint discrimination, and that cannot be allowed at any time.29 As Justice
Scalia put it, if the Bias Motivated Crime ordinance were upheld,
"[o]ne could hold up a sign saying, for example, that all 'antiCatholic bigots' are misbegotten; but not that all 'papists' are, for
that would insult and provoke violence 'on the basis of religion'.
St. Paul has no such authority to license one side of a debate to
fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of
Queensbury Rules. "30
On a first reading this hypothetical appears so bizarre, as
well as perhaps difficult to follow, that one might conclude that a
law student has worked too hard to manufacture a difference.
When is the last time we saw a sign which said that "all antiCatholic bigots are misbegotten"? I think Justice Scalia has a
point here, but it takes some working through.
Justice Stevens, in reply, claims that
23. Id. at 2545.
24. Id. at 2546 (emphasis in original).
25. 394 u.s. 705 (1969).
26. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 2547.
29. The Supreme Court has recently accepted certiorari in the case of Rosenberger
v. Rector, University of Virginia. The question presented is: "Does Establishment Clause
compel state university to exclude otherwise eligible student publication from participation in student activities fund, solely on basis of its religious viewpoint, when such exclusion would violate Speech and Press Clauses if viewpoint of publication were nonreligious?" 63 U.S.L.W. 3276 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1994) (No. 94-329).
30. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2548.
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the Court's reasoning is asymmetrical. The response to a sign
saying that "all [religious] bigots are misbegotten" is a sign
saying that "all advocates of religious tolerance are misbegotten." Assuming such signs could be fighting words (which
seems to me extremely unlikely), neither sign would be
banned by the ordinance for the attacks were not "based on
... religion" but rather on one's beliefs about tolerance.Jt

Justice Stevens' revision did not so much make the arguments symmetrical as it shifted the grounds from particularity to
generality. One can imagine an argument on the pros and cons
of religious tolerance, but street talk gets down to particulars,
and at that level Justice Scalia's description is accurate.
Another way to consider the issue is to think of profane
words (Justice Scalia's "misbegotten" is a euphemism for one of
them) addressed to an individual in such a way as likely to incite
to violence and then combine those words with the proscribed
categories of the ordinance: race, color, creed, religion, or gender. According to Justice Stevens, the ordinance, assuming that
it is not fatally overbroad, "regulates speech not on the basis of
its subject matter or the viewpoint expressed, but rather on the
basis of the harm the speech causes. "32 The ordinance regulates
"only a subcategory of expression that causes injuries based on
'race, color, creed, religion, or gender,' not a subcategory that
involves discussions that concern those characteristics."JJ But
according to Justice Scalia, the effect is a viewpoint based ordinance: there were many content and viewpoint neutral alternatives available to St. Paul-the laws were on the books available
for use-but "the only interest distinctively served by the content
limitation [we might say the content emphasis] is that of displaying the city council's special hostility towards the particular biases thus singled out. That is precisely what the Frrst
Amendment forbids. "34 Justice Scalia seems to be right that the
ordinance, as it has been interpreted to keep it constitutional,
singles out for special prohibition those fighting words which
convey hostility and are likely to incite to violence on the basis of
certain categories only, not others.

31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 2571 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 2570 (emphasis in original).
Id.
ld. at 2550.
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II

In Wisconsin v. Mitchell, decided one year after R.A. V. v. St.
Paul, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Wisconsin
Supreme Court and sustained a Wisconsin statute, similar to that
of many other states, which provides for penalty enhancements
for hate crimes, where the victim was intentionally selected because of his or her race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry.3s The Wisconsin Supreme
Court had found two first amendment violations in the "because
of" character of the selection: it impermissibly punished "what
the legislature has deemed to be offensive thought," and it had
an indirect "chilling effect" on free speech as well.36 On the first
point, the court argued that "[m]erely because the statute refers
in a literal sense to the intentional 'conduct' of selecting, [it] does
not mean the court must tum a blind eye to the intent and practical effect of the law-punishment of offensive motive or
thought."37 To confirm that the statute punished "bigoted
thought," which involves "the actor's motive or reason for singling out the particular person against whom he or she commits a
crime,"38 not merely "conduct," the Wisconsin Supreme Court
quoted from an amended version of the law, which clarified that
the ground of selection "in whole or in part because of the actor's
belief or perception regarding the race ... whether or not the actor's belief or perception was correct."39
The "chilling effect," or "overbreadth" argument is that
under this statute a misdemeanor is converted into a felony
merely because of the spoken word. For example, if A strikes
B in the face he commits a criminal battery. However, should
A add a word such as "nigger," "honkey," "jew," "mick,"
"kraut," "spic," or "queer," the crime becomes a felony, and
A will be punished not for his conduct alone-a misdemeanor-but for using the spoken word. Obviously, the state
would respond that the speech is merely an indication that A
35. The statute at the time of Mitchell's crime is reproduced in full in Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. a. at 2197 n.l.
36. 485 N.W.2d 807, 811 (Wis. 1992). This opinion frequently quotes from Susan
Gellman's excellent law review article: Sticks and Stones Can Put You In Jai~ But Can
Words Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation
Laws, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 333 (1991).
37. 485 N.W.2d at 813.
38. ld.
39. Id. at 813 n.12. The italicized portion is new. While the amended statute
postdated Mitchell's trial, the majority evidently took it to clarify the original intention,
not to change anything. "Thus the legislature has removed any doubt that the aim of the
statute is the actor's subjective motivation." ld.
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intentionally selected B because of his particular race or
ethnicity, but the fact remains that the necessity to use speech
to prove this intentional selection threatens to chill free
speech. Opprobrious though the speech may be, an individual
must be allowed to utter it without fear of punishment by the
state.40

Two Justices on the Wisconsin high court dissented. One,
acknowledging that she would not have supported such a statute,
wrote that "the tight nexus between the selection of the victim
and the underlying crime ... saves this statute."4t The other regarded the law as an "anti-discrimination" law more than anything else: "both [traditional anti-discrimination laws and this
"hate crimes" type] involve discrimination, both involve victims,
both involve actions 'because of' the victim's status."42
In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the statute enhances the maximum penalty "for conduct motivated by a discriminatory point of view," thereby
punishing it "more severely than the same conduct engaged in
for some other reason or for no reason at all. "43 The Court then
solved this seemingly difficult first amendment issue with reference to the traditional leeway given to sentencing judges on the
one hand and the primary responsibility of legislatures "for fixing
criminal penalties" on the other.44 The Court also likened what
Wisconsin's legislature did to what juries do in death penalty
cases, when they consider aggravating and extenuating circumstances in the penalty phase of their deliberations.4s But this
statute singles out for special enhanced punishment only one factor from among many. A sentencing judge given discretion is
required to take into account the "totality of circumstances" in
setting the proper punishment. A sentencing jury in a capital
case is required to take account of any and all aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, and it must find at least one aggravating circumstance to decide on the death penalty. Similarly, the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines reflect a congressionally authorized and approved ranking of degrees of severity of crimes and
corresponding punishments.
While the Court's argument does not address the free
speech issue directly, it seems to signal a minimalist scrutiny of
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 816.
ld. at 818 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 820 (Bablitch, J ., dissenting).
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. a. at 2199.
44. Id. at 2200.
45. Id.
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the statute, notwithstanding the strict scrutiny to which statutes
challenged under the First Amendment are supposed to be subjected. This is confirmed by the next step in the argument, where
the Court claimed that "motive plays the same role under the
Wisconsin statute as it does under federal and state antidiscrimination laws, which we have previously upheld against constitutional challenge."46 But the underlying act in the enhanced
penalty for hate crimes law-the basic misdemeanor or felonyis itself unlawful, with the victim selection then identified for an
enhanced penalty. The underlying act in a civil anti-discrimination case is a selection of one or more over others for employment or admission, which, in the absence of the additional illegal
act-of selection or non-selection on the basis of one of the proscribed categories- is not itself illegal. Put differently, one does
not ordinarily have a right to be selected for a competitive position, but given the prevalence of frequent discrimination against
certain well-defined discrete minorities, government which aims
to secure equal rights has no alternative but to pass and uphold
traditional anti-discrimination laws.
We do have a choice when it comes to criminal law, where
the ordinary expectation is that law and punishment takes account of all relevant features of culpability. Consider, for example, an alternative to our actual case, in which a few young men
decide to select their victims arbitrarily and beat them to a pulp,
either for money or just for the sheer pleasure of doing it. Which
is the more heinous crime, and hence which should be punished
the more severely? In our case, Mitchell could conceivably argue
in mitigation that he was "carried away for the moment" by the
images of racial injustice against blacks that he had just seen in
Mississippi Burning.
When the Supreme Court finally addressed the free speech
issue, it simply asserted that unlike the R.A. V. case, which "was
explicitly directed at expression," "the statute in this case is
aimed at conduct unprotected by the First Amendment."47 This
limp assertion is disappointing. More needs to be said, but all we
get is the statement that "this (bias-inspired] conduct is thought
to inflict greater individual and societal harm."48 With a reference to Blackstone on the reasonableness of having crimes of different natures punished with different severities, a brief rejection
of the "chilling effect" argument as "too speculative" when ap46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id. at 2201.
ld.
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plied to the bigot who must suppress his expression for fear of
subsequently having it enhance a penalty, and a remark that
speech is sometimes used as evidence "to establish the elements
of a crime," as in treason cases, the Court concludes that the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin must be reversed.49
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decisions in these two cases may each
be justified: the former on the basis of the problem with viewpoint discrimination and the latter on the basis of the difference
between a regulation which suppresses speech directly and a regulation whose purpose is to punish conduct, but which incidentally punishes expression. Each case, however, involves a
constitutional challenge to a legislative attempt to "denounce"
certain forms of speech which common-sensically, as Justice Stevens has written, rank very low but which our First Amendment
constitutional doctrines, deriving from the political philosophy of
John Stuart Mill, namely viewpoint neutrality, do not permit the
Court to treat in that common-sensical manner.so Much of what
Justice Stevens says about different levels of speech deserves to
be considered, but controversies over speech codes at Michigan,
Stanford, and the University of Pennsylvania reveal that in the
absence of a viewpoint neutrality approach, the protected categories are subject to the partisanship of the "politically correct."
Gerald Gunther includes in his recent constitutional law
casebook the relevant text of Stanford's speech code. It appears
to track "fighting words," but Gunther, who opposed the code,
then reports that
[a]s interpreted by the Chair of the Council which promulgated this "discriminatory harassment" regulation, it would
not bar a black student from calling a white student a "honky
SOB," on the ground that the white majority is not in as much
need of protection from such speech as are those who have
suffered discrimination.st

That's why Justice Scalia wrote the opinion he did in R.A. V. and
that's why he was right.
As for Wisconsin v. Mitchell, I think Justice Shirley Abrahamson of the Wisconsin Supreme Court got it right when she
said: "Had I been in the legislature, I do not believe I would have
49. ld. at 2201-02.
50. In addition to his R.A. V. opinion, see Justice Stevens' recent essay, The Freedom
of Speech, 102 Yale LJ. 1293 (1993).
51. Gunther, Constitutional Law at 1135 n.2 (cited in note 8).
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supported this statute because I do not think this statute will accomplish its goal. "sz The statute introduces race and other such
controversial classifications where they are not necessary and
where they are likely to do more mischief than good.

52. 485 N.W.2d at 818.

